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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-3946 
___________ 
 
PJETER SHQUTAJ; GJELINA SHQUTAJ; J.S.; D.S.; V.S., 
   Petitioners 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
Respondent 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency Nos. A096-241-606; A096-241-607;  
A096-241-608; A096-241-609; A096-241-610) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Miriam K. Mills 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 3, 2013 
Before:  FUENTES, HARDIMAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  April 4, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pjeter Shqutaj and his wife, Gjelina Shqutaj, on behalf of themselves and their 
three minor children (collectively “the Petitioners”), petition for review of the Board of 
2 
 
Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA” or “Board”) denial of their motion to reopen.  For the 
following reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
 The Petitioners, natives and citizens of Albania, entered the United States without 
inspection and were placed in removal proceedings.  They conceded their removability 
and applied for asylum and withholding of removal on the ground that they suffered 
persecution on account of their activities on behalf of the Albanian Democratic Party.
1
  
The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied relief, finding that the Petitioners’ testimony was 
not credible, and ordered them removed to Albania in November 2005.  The BIA 
dismissed their administrative appeal in August 2007.
2
 
 In May 2011, the Petitioners filed a motion to reopen with the BIA based on 
purportedly new and material evidence of changed country conditions in Albania.  The 
motion included a declaration by the Petitioners’ attorney; news articles; an expert 
affidavit and curriculum vitae of Professor Bernd Fischer; a letter of “Confirmation” from 
the Chairman of an organization known as Formerly Persecuted Persons (FPP) of which 
Mr. Shqutaj is a member; and a Democratic Party membership card.  The BIA denied the 
motion, stating that it was untimely, and that it did not meet an exception to the 
timeliness requirements, as the evidence submitted was “insufficient to warrant reopening 
                                              
1
 Mr. and Mrs. Shqutaj filed separate applications for asylum, each indicating that their 
children were derivative applicants.  The agency considered their applications together. 
 
2
 Although they filed a petition for a review of that decision in this Court, the case was 
dismissed for failure to prosecute. 
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based on changed country conditions in Albania.”  (Administrative Record (“A.R.”) at 4.)  
The BIA also noted that the Petitioners’ evidence failed to address the IJ’s prior adverse 
credibility determination.  This petition for review followed. 
 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and review a decision denying a 
motion to reopen for abuse of discretion.  Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 
2004).  Under this standard, we may not disturb the BIA’s decision unless it is “arbitrary, 
irrational, or contrary to law.”  Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 A motion to reopen generally must be “filed within 90 days of the date of entry of 
a final administrative order of removal.”  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i).  The Petitioners’ 
motion was filed beyond the allotted 90 days.  However, as the BIA noted, the time 
limitation does not apply if the movant seeks reopening “[t]o apply or reapply for asylum 
or withholding of deportation based on changed circumstances arising in the country of 
nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been 
discovered or presented at the previous hearing.”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).   The 
Petitioners argue that they established changed country conditions.  We disagree. 
 The Petitioners first contend that the BIA erred in determining that the materials 
they submitted with their motion to reopen did not adequately address the IJ’s prior 
adverse credibility determination.
3
  They assert that the Democratic Party membership 
                                              
3
 The IJ found that Petitioners were not credible based on: the failure of Mrs. Shqutaj to 
mention five of her husband’s six arrests while he was engaging in political activities; 
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card they submitted, as well as the letter from the FPP stating that they had been 
persecuted because of their political opinion, served to resolve the adverse credibility 
problems.  We agree with the BIA that, while these documents might have corroborated 
the Petitioners’ membership in the Democratic Party, they did not resolve their credibility 
problems, which did not extend to such membership.  Furthermore, it is not unreasonable 
for the BIA to conclude that evidence submitted with a motion to reopen is not “material” 
where it does not rebut an adverse credibility finding.  See Khan v. Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d 
488, 497 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 The Petitioners also argue that the Board erred in concluding that the evidence that 
they submitted failed to establish material changes in Albania with regard to the 
treatment of those who support the Democratic Party.  We conclude that the BIA 
reasonably found that these materials, including the affidavit of Dr. Fischer, do not 
demonstrate materially changed conditions since the 2005 hearing.  Rather, the evidence 
can be fairly said to reflect a continuation of longstanding political instability in Albania.
4
  
See Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 161 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that the BIA did not 
err in denying reopening where “the conditions described have persisted”); cf. Shardar v. 
Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 315 (3d Cir. 2007) (“The re-emergence of the political party 
                                                                                                                                                  
Mr. Shqutaj’s failure to mention in his declaration a beating he received in December 
2001 by the Albanian police; and Mrs. Shqutaj’s different description of that same 
December 2001 incident.  (A.R. 30-31.) 
 
4
 Although the Petitioners urge us to consider a purportedly similar case where the BIA 
granted reopening for an Albanian national named Rrok Dekaj, we are limited to review 
5 
 
responsible for the applicant’s prior persecution is the type of situation that would 
constitute a change in country conditions.”). 
 Finally, the Petitioners argue that the BIA failed to consider all the evidence they 
submitted with their motion to reopen in violation of their due process rights.  We 
disagree.  The BIA clearly considered the expert affidavit and other documentation that 
the Petitioners submitted, but it found that they had not established grounds for 
reopening.  Cf. Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 268-69 (3d Cir. 2008) (remanding 
where the BIA “fail[ed] to discuss most of the evidentiary record” in connection with a 
motion to reopen).  We discern no due process violation. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
                                                                                                                                                  
of the administrative record in the present case.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A). 
